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Abstract 
Regions in a federal system, as in the case Nigeria, tend to have economic characteristics 
that diverge from each other and while monetary and fiscal policies appear to be strongly 
nationally oriented their importance and relevance appear to be regionally determined. 
However, also important, and more important for this study, is the view that regional 
macroeconomic policies – that is, the fiscal policies of the state or regional governments and 
the implications of national monetary policies for regional economies – do not only impact 
on the source region but can also transcend the borders of the source region to other 
neighboring regions and cause adjustments or distortions that may have important 
macroeconomic implications for the regions in a federating system. 
Towards this end, this article investigates, using the aggregate supply, aggregate demand 
and balance of payment (AS/AD/BP) framework with special assumptions that capture the 
characteristics of the regions in a federating system typical of Nigeria, the macroeconomic 
interconnectedness of regions in a federating unit and considers the macroeconomic 
spillover effects of the fiscal policies of regional governments as well as the regional 
implications of national monetary policies. 
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1. BACKGROUND 
Federal systems present a picture of regional economies and a national economy running 
concurrently with regional fiscal and national monetary policies being enacted and their impacts 
playing in out. Such a picture is expected to present an interesting mix of implications of 
regional fiscal and national monetary policies which often may be conflicting or in agreement 
with respect to the response of regional macroeconomic variables. This is undoubtedly the 
situation in Nigeria and more interesting is the observed fact that some regions in the federating 
system are more developed that the others – as reflected in the concentration of most of the 
financial institutions in Lagos state than in some other state like Taraba or Borno – and this 
sophistication in developed regions could be reflected in the consumers and investors having 
access to loan facilities and having a hoard of real money balances. In addition, it is also 
observed that some of these relatively more developed regions in federal countries like Nigeria 
are relatively more open to international trade whilst less developed regions engage in 
interregional trade with the relative more open regional economies. Also worthy of note is the 
relative strength of labour unions in developed regions in a federal economy unlike in regions 
that are not as developed. 
The duality of federal economies is not a new phenomenon in literature as it is reflected in the 
concept of ‘first city bias’, as seen in Todaro and Smith (2012, pp325), where lopsided 
development in the regions of a developing country results from the initial socio-economic and 
political contact of the colonial powers with these developing countries. However given this 
phenomenon there is a paucity of studies that have adequately addressed the macroeconomic 
spillover effects of regional fiscal policies and the regional macroeconomic response to national 
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monetary policies in a dualistic federal economic systemin developing countries like Nigeria, 
unlike in advanced economies and this is reflected in the literature review. 
Towards the end of examine the theoretical ramifications of the effect of regional fiscal and 
national monetary policies on regions in a federating system, this article avails the Keynesian 
Aggregate Supply-Aggregate Demand-Balance of Payment (AS-AD-BP) framework and 
examines a hypothetical case of two regions in a federal economy with each region’s fiscal 
policies and the national monetary policy impact on the regional macroeconomic variables being 
examined. 
This article is composite of four sections. The following section highlights the literature review 
and this is followed by the section that contains the derivation of the general equilibrium AS-
AD-BP model. The last section discusses the implications of the a priori findings of the third 
section and details of the AS-AD-BP analysis are presented in the appendix to this article. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The analysis of the regional impact of fiscal and monetary policies and how they can 
engenderinter-regional spillovers that could be reflected in the convergence of the regions in the 
country, a redistribution of resources between regions in a dualistic national economy and 
response of macroeconomic variables in these regions is evident in relatively recent studies like: 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990); Obstfeld and Peri (1998); Rey and Montouri (1999); Bouvet 
(2007) and Porsse et al (2007). However similar studies on developing countries, like Nigeria, 
are scant as most authors, such as: Omitogun and Ayinla (2007); Appah (2010); Babalola and 
Aminu (2011); Osuala and Ebieri (2014) have only examined the effect of federal fiscal policies 
on the aggregate output with no consideration of the differential effect of such policies on the 
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regions of the federation or the effect of regional policies on the regional macroeconomic climate 
– with the exception of studies like Wantchekon and Asadurian (2002) that investigates the case 
of transfer dependence and regional disparities in Nigeria. Whilst the limitation imposed by the 
availability of data could readily be a reason for the paucity of research in this area, the immense 
benefit of the results of such a study to policy making at the regional level is profoundly relevant 
for arming regional governments with information that would enable them tailor fiscal policy 
operations to enable them maximize the social benefits. 
3. GENERAL MACROECONOMIC EQUILIBRIUM OF TWO REGIONS IN A 
FEDERATING SYSTEM 
In this section of this article a theoretical examination of the macroeconomic equilibrium of the 
regions in a federal system is considered using the AS-AD-BP framework. The statement of 
assumptions underlying the model is presented, with these assumptions based on some of the 
empirical facts derived from the regional economies in Nigeria and the sequel to the statement of 
assumptions the mathematical model is presented and the necessary propositions on the role of 
monetary and fiscal policy are outlined. 
3.1 STATEMENT OF ASSUMPTIONS 
The macroeconomic model designed in this study is based on certain assumptions that capture 
the features of a national economy made up of regions. There are two regions, regions 1 and 2, in 
the hypothetical national economy. The region 2 is assumed to be relatively less sophisticated 
than the region 1 as the aggregate consumption function is not a function of interest rate or real 
money balances as in the case of the region 1. The aggregate investment function for the region 1 
is augmented with real money balances while the region 2 is not and in both regions government 
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expenditure is assumed to be constant. Still on the Keynesian identity for both regions, region 1 
is assumed to be a small open economy that records real and capital flows with respect to the 
global economy and the region 2. However the region 2 is assumed to be closed to international 
trade but open to real and capital flows from the region 1.  
Labour in the region 1 is assumed to be organized into unions and hence wages in the region 1 
are, in addition to other factors, subject to expected prices but in the region 2 this is not the case 
as expected prices are not factored into the wage fixing decisions. Labour is assumed to be 
mobile between the regions and hence the employment in each region is assumed to partly 
growth steadily over time and partly a function of the wage differentials between the two 
regions. 
Interest rates in both regions are directly affected by the monetary policy rate which is itself 
based on a rule that avails the aggregate quantities of the first difference in the price level and the 
output level. It must be noted that the aggregate price level is the weighted average of the prices 
of the regions 1 and 2 as well as the aggregate output. The monetary policy rule is assumed not 
to discriminate in its fixing of the policy rate in response to the peculiarities of the regions 1 and 
2 but rather it fixes a single policy rate based on aggregate quantities of price and output. 
3.2 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
3.2.1 Real Sector Equilibrium in the Regions 1 and 2 
Assuming a country with two regions and a central government, a cursory examination of the 
regions and the central government is conducted. The first region is assumed to be a small open 
economy and hence its national output 𝑌1𝑡  equals the sum of its consumption expenditure 𝐶1𝑡 , 
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investment expenditure 𝐼1𝑡  and net exports 𝑋1𝑡 − 𝐼𝑀1𝑡  which has components of international 
and inter-regional trade and hence: 
𝑌1𝑡 = 𝐶1𝑡 + 𝐼1𝑡 + 𝐺1𝑡 + 𝑋1𝑡 − 𝐼𝑀1𝑡 … 3.1 
Consumption 𝐶1𝑡  in the first region is assumed to be influenced by current income 𝑌1𝑡 , interest 
rate 𝑟1𝑡 , as financial institutions are assumed to be relatively functional, and real cash balances 
𝑀1𝑡/𝑃1𝑡as agents in the first region are assumed to hold real cash balances and hence the 
consumption function is given as: 
𝐶1𝑡 = 𝐶1  𝑌1𝑑𝑡 , 𝑟1𝑡 ,
𝑀1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 where 𝐶1𝑦𝑑 > 0;𝐶1𝑟 < 0,𝐶1𝑚 > 0… 3.2 
Disposable income 𝑌1𝑑𝑡  is given as: 
𝑌1𝑑𝑡 = 𝑌1𝑡 − 𝑇1 𝑌1𝑡 where 0 < 𝑇𝑦 = 𝑡1 < 1… 3.3 
And hence the consumption function is given as: 
𝐶1𝑡 = 𝐶1  𝑌1𝑡 − 𝑇1 𝑌1𝑡 , 𝑟1𝑡 ,
𝑀1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
  … 3.4 
Investment 𝐼1𝑡  in the first region is partly dependent on the level of income 𝑌1𝑡 , the interest rate 
𝑟1𝑡  and real money balances 𝑀1𝑡/𝑃1𝑡  and hence the investment function is given as: 
𝐼1𝑡 = 𝐼1  𝑌1𝑡 , 𝑟1𝑡 ,
𝑀1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 where 𝐼1𝑦 > 0, 𝐼1𝑟 < 0, 𝐼1𝑚 > 0, 𝐼1𝑝 < 0… 3.5 
Government consumption expenditure in the region 1, 𝐺1𝑡  is assumed to be exogenously given as 
𝐺 1and hence: 
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𝐺1𝑡 = 𝐺 1 … 3.6 
Exports 𝑋1𝑡  in the first region is assumed to be a function of real exchange rate 𝑒𝑥𝑡 .𝑃𝑓𝑡/𝑃1𝑡  
while imports 𝐼𝑀1𝑡  is assumed to be a function of both real exchange rate 𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑃𝑓𝑡/𝑃1𝑡  and 
income 𝑌1𝑡  and hence: 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝑋  𝑒𝑥𝑡 ,
𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
,
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 where  𝑋𝑒𝑥 > 0,𝑋𝑝1𝑡 < 0,𝑋𝑝2𝑡 > 0… 3.7 
𝐼𝑀𝑡 = 𝐼𝑀  𝑒𝑥𝑡 ,
𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
,
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
,𝑌1𝑡 where 𝐼𝑀𝑒𝑥 < 0; 𝐼𝑀𝑝1𝑡 > 0; 𝐼𝑀𝑝2𝑡 > 0; 𝐼𝑀𝑦 > 0… 3.8 
On substituting the equations 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 into the equation 3.1 then the 
following results: 
𝑌1𝑡 = 𝐶1  𝑌1𝑡 − 𝑇1 𝑌1𝑡 , 𝑟1𝑡 ,
𝑀1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 + 𝐼1  𝑌1𝑡 , 𝑟1𝑡 ,
𝑀1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 + 𝐺 1 + 𝑋  𝑒𝑥𝑡 ,
𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
,
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 
− 𝐼𝑀  𝑒𝑥𝑡 ,
𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
,
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
,𝑌1𝑡 … 3.9 
In the region 2, households finance consumption from current disposable income 𝑌2𝑑𝑡  alone as 
households do not have access to lending facilities and do not have wealth holdings, investments 
𝐼2𝑡  are assumed to be dependent on income 𝑌2𝑡  and interest rate 𝑟2𝑡 , while government spending 
𝐺2𝑡  for the region 2 is assumed to be exogenously given as 𝐺 2. In addition it is assumed that the 
region 2 is not open to international trade, unlike the region 1, but it carries out inter-regional 
trade with the region 1 such that what would be termed ‘net exports’ is actually the net trade with 
the region 1. The aggregate expenditure 𝑌2𝑡  is defined in the following manner. 
𝑌2𝑡 = 𝐶2𝑡 + 𝐼2𝑡 + 𝐺2𝑡 + 𝑋2𝑡 − 𝐼𝑀2𝑡 …3.10 
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In the light of the aforementioned assumptions the consumption, disposable income function and 
investment functions of the region 2 is given as: 
𝐶2𝑡 = 𝐶2 𝑌𝑑𝑡  where 𝐶𝑦 > 0… 3.11 
𝑌2𝑑𝑡 = 𝑌2𝑡 − 𝑇2 𝑌𝑡 where  𝑇2𝑦 > 0 …3.12 
𝐼2𝑡 = 𝐼2 𝑌2𝑡 , 𝑟2𝑡 where 𝐼2𝑦 > 0, 𝐼2𝑟 < 0… 3.13 
and 
𝐺2𝑡 = 𝐺 2 … 3.14 
Net exports for the region 2, defined as net inter-regional trade between the region 1 and the 
region 2, is given as: 
𝑋  
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 − 𝐼𝑀  
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
,𝑌2𝑡 where 𝑋𝑝2 < 0;𝑋𝑝1 < 0; 𝐼𝑀𝑝2 > 0; 𝐼𝑀𝑝1 > 0; 𝐼𝑀𝑦2 > 0 
On substituting the values of the equations 3.11, 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14 into the equations 3.10, 
differentiating totally and re-arranging the terms the following results: 
𝑌2𝑡 = 𝐶2 𝑌2𝑡 − 𝑇2 𝑌𝑡  + 𝐼2 𝑌2𝑡 , 𝑟2𝑡 + 𝐺 2 + 𝑋  
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 − 𝐼𝑀  
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
,𝑌2𝑡 … 3.15 
3.3.2 Monetary Equilibrium in the Regions 1 and 2 
On turning to the monetary equilibrium in the 2 regions, it is assumed that households in the 
region 1 have both speculative and transactionary motives for holding money while the region 2, 
much less sophisticated, has households holding money for transactionary purposes and hence 
the following liquidity preference functions are defined for the regions 1 and 2 respectively: 
10 | P a g e  
 
𝐿1𝑡 = 𝐿1 𝑌1𝑡 , 𝑟1𝑡 where 𝐿1𝑦 > 0,𝐿1𝑟 < 0…3.16 
𝐿2𝑡 = 𝐿2 𝑌2𝑡  where 𝐿2𝑦 > 0… 3.17 
and given the supply of money for both regions which are exogenously given: 𝑀1𝑡/𝑃1𝑡  and 
𝑀2𝑡/𝑃2𝑡  the equilibrium in the money sectors for both regions are given as: 
𝑀1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
= 𝐿1 𝑌1𝑡 , 𝑟1𝑡 … 3.18 
𝑀2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
= 𝐿2 𝑌2𝑡 … 3.19 
3.3.3 Balance of Payment Equilibrium 
The region 1 is not only assumed to have trade ties with the region 2 but it also has financial ties 
and hence with this information the balance of payment identity corresponding to the region 1 is 
depicted equating the sum of the net exports for region 1, 𝑋1𝑡 − 𝐼𝑀1𝑡 , capital inflows 𝐾𝐴1 from 
the foreign sector and capital inflows 𝐾𝐴2 from the region 2 to the reserves 𝑅𝐸𝑆𝑡  and therefore 
the following results: 
𝑋  𝑒𝑥𝑡 ,
𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
,
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 − 𝐼𝑀  𝑒𝑥𝑡 ,
𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
,
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
,𝑌1𝑡 + 𝐾𝐴1 𝑟1𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 + 𝐾𝐴2 𝑟1𝑡 − 𝑟2𝑡 
= 𝑅𝐸𝑆1𝑡where 𝐾1𝑟1 > 0,𝐾2𝑟2 < 0,𝐾1𝑟𝑓 < 0… 3.20 
In the region 2, net exports: 𝑋2𝑡 − 𝐼𝑀2𝑡 , which is specially defined as the net trade between it 
and the region 1, is summed with the negative of the capital inflow function of the region 1, 
−𝐾𝐴2 to obtain the reserves for the region 2 which is given as: 
𝑋  
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 − 𝐼𝑀  
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
,𝑌1𝑡 − 𝐾𝐴2 𝑟1𝑡 − 𝑟2𝑡 = 𝑅𝐸𝑆2𝑡where  𝐾1𝑟1 > 0,𝐾2𝑟2 < 0,𝐾1𝑟𝑓 < 0… 3.21 
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3.3.4 Equilibrium Productivity and Employment in the Regions 1 and 2 
Given the production functions for the regions 1 and 2, where capital is held constant, signaling 
that this analysis is in the short run where capital is fixed in both regions: 
𝑌1𝑡 = 𝑌 𝑁1𝑡 ,𝐾 1 where 𝑌1𝑁1 > 0,𝑌1𝑁1𝑁1 < 0 … 3.22 
𝑌2𝑡 = 𝑌 𝑁2𝑡 ,𝐾 2 where 𝑌2𝑁2 > 0,𝑌2𝑁2𝑁2 < 0 … 3.23 
However, going by the marginal productivity theory, firms would continue to demand for labour 
until the marginal physical product of labour equals the real wage which is assumed to be given, 
assuming that there is perfect competition in the labour and goods markets in both regions. 
Hence the following results: 
𝑌1𝑁1 =
𝑊1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
… 3.24 
𝑌2𝑁2 =
𝑊2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
… 3.25 
On the supply of employment, the real wages 𝑊1𝑡/𝑃1𝑡  in the region 1 is assumed to be positive 
function of the supply of employment 𝑁1𝑡  and expected prices 𝑃1𝑒𝑡  and there is a equi-
proportional positive relationship between the real wages 𝑊1𝑡/𝑃1𝑡  and the ratio of the expected 
price 𝑃1𝑒𝑡  to the actual price 𝑃1𝑡 : 
𝑊1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
=
𝑃1𝑒𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
.𝑊1 𝑁1𝑡 where 𝑊1𝑁1 > 0 … 3.26 
In the region 2, employment is mostly informal and thus the wage bill 𝑊2𝑡  in this region is 
assumed to be a function of employment 𝑁2𝑡  only as labour in the region 2 is not organized into 
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labour unions and do not have the power to revise their real or nominal wages in the event of an 
inflationary trend, unlike in the region 1 and hence: 
𝑊2𝑡 = 𝑊2 𝑁2𝑡 where 𝑊2𝑁2 > 0 …3.27 
At equilibrium it is expected that: 
𝑊1 = 𝑌1𝑁1 .
𝑃1𝑡
𝑃1𝑒𝑡
… 3.28 
𝑊2 = 𝑌2𝑁2𝑃2𝑡 … 3.29 
In conclusion, of the equilibrium in the productivity and employment sectors of the regions 1 and 
2, it is assumed that labour, and hence employment 𝑁1𝑡 , in the region 1 is partly due to the 
natural growth rate of the labour force participation in regions 1 which is assumed to be identical 
to the population growth rate 𝜙𝑝𝑔1 and partly due to the region 2 to region 1 migration in 
response to real wage differentials 𝑊1𝑡/𝑃1𝑡  −𝑊2𝑡/𝑃2𝑡  and hence the following results: 
𝑁1𝑡 =  𝑒
𝜙𝑝𝑔 1𝑡𝑁1  
𝑊1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
−
𝑊2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
 where 0 < 𝜙𝑝𝑔1 < 1,𝑁1𝑊1 > 0,𝑁1𝑃1 < 0,𝑁1𝑊2 < 0,𝑁1𝑃2
> 0… 3.30 
In the region 2, a symmetrical effect occurs and the expected relationships in the equations above 
are reversed the yield the below equation: 
𝑁2𝑡 = 𝑒
𝜙𝑝𝑔 2𝑡𝑁2  
𝑊1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
−
𝑊2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
 where 0 < 𝜙𝑝𝑔2 < 1,𝑁2𝑊1 < 0,𝑁1𝑃1 > 0,𝑁1𝑊2 > 0,𝑁1𝑃2
< 0… 3.31 
3.3.5 Monetary Policy Rule 
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The monetary authority, which operates at the national level, is assumed to carry out its 
operations in strict accordance with the objectives of maintaining the internal and external 
stability and this it does by commitment to the monetary policy rule which stipulates that the 
monetary authority sets the policy rate 𝑟𝑡  equal to the sum of the long run real interest rate 𝑟
∗, the 
term in inflation rate: 𝜏𝑝𝑑𝑃𝑡/𝑃𝑡 , income term 𝜏𝑦𝑌𝑡  
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜏0 + 𝑟
∗ + 𝜏𝑝  
𝑑𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡
  + 𝜏𝑦𝑌𝑡 … 3.32 
where 𝜏0 = 𝜏𝑝 − 𝜏𝑝𝑑𝑃 /𝑃 − 𝜏𝑦𝑌 > 0; 𝜏𝑝 > 1;  0 < 𝜏𝑦 < 1 
However implicit in the monetary rule of 3.32 is the assumption that the monetary policy rule 
does not provide for discriminatory impact coefficients for the regions 1 and 2 and hence builds 
its policy response to aggregate price changes and aggregate income changes. This hence 
requires that an aggregate condition be designed for the general price level 𝑃𝑡  and the national 
output 𝑌𝑡  and these are defined below:  
𝑃𝑡 = 𝜙𝑝𝑃1𝑡 +  1 − 𝜙𝑝 𝑃2𝑡 … 3.33 
and 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌1𝑡 + 𝑌2𝑡 … 3.34 
Though monetary policy is assumed to respond to aggregate quantities, and not respond in a 
discriminating manner to the peculiarities of the regions 1 and 2, the effects of monetary policy 
is actually discriminating as it is assumed that there are differentials in responses of commercial 
banks, the sole assumed vehicle of monetary policy, with respect to the policies of the monetary 
authority. With the financial system in the region 1 more sophisticated that those of the region 2 
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it is expected that given the trajectory of commercial banks lending in the region 1, monetary 
policy rate 𝑟𝑡  would have a weaker influence 𝜙𝑟1 on region 1 interest rate 𝑟1𝑡  and hence liquidity 
as commercial banks would avail its reserves and reallocate liquidity from the region 1 to act a 
buffer and by so doing raise the interest rate of the region 2 by the term 𝜙𝑟21𝑟1𝑡 . Unlike the 
region 1, the region 2 is open to the greater influence of monetary policy, denoted by the term 
𝜙𝑟2𝑟𝑡 , through the commercial banks due to preferential treatment given by the commercial 
banks to the region 1. The region 1 interest rate equation is augmented with the parity condition 
(𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑡/𝑒𝑥) 1 + 𝑟𝑓  for liquidity flows from the foreign sector. Hence in the light of the 
aforementioned the following results: 
𝑟1𝑡 = 𝜙10 + 𝜙𝑟1𝑟𝑡 + 𝑟𝑓 − 𝑒𝑥𝑡 … 3.35 
𝑟2𝑡 = 𝜙20 + 𝜙𝑟2𝑟𝑡 + 𝜙𝑟21𝑟1𝑡 … 3.36 
where𝜙𝑟2 > 𝜙𝑟1,𝜙𝑟1 > 0,𝜙𝑟2 > 0,𝜙𝑟21 > 0;𝜙10 < 0;𝜙20 < 0 
The main equations that shall form the basis of tracing the impact of regional governments and 
national monetary policies are: 
𝑌1𝑡 = 𝐶1  𝑌1𝑡 − 𝑇1 𝑌1𝑡 , 𝑟1𝑡 ,
𝑀1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 + 𝐼1  𝑌1𝑡 , 𝑟1𝑡 ,
𝑀1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 + 𝐺 1 + 𝑋  𝑒𝑥𝑡 ,
𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
,
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 
− 𝐼𝑀  𝑒𝑥𝑡 ,
𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
,
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
,𝑌1𝑡 = 0… 3.9 
𝑌2𝑡 = 𝐶2 𝑌2𝑡 − 𝑇2 𝑌𝑡  + 𝐼2 𝑌2𝑡 , 𝑟2𝑡 + 𝐺 2 + 𝑋  
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 − 𝐼𝑀  
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
,𝑌2𝑡 … 3.15 
𝑀1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
= 𝐿1 𝑌1𝑡 , 𝑟1𝑡 … 3.18 
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𝑀2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
= 𝐿2 𝑌2𝑡 … 3.19 
𝑅𝐸𝑆1𝑡 − 𝑋  𝑒𝑥𝑡 ,
𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
,
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 + 𝐼𝑀  𝑒𝑥𝑡 ,
𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
,
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
,𝑌1𝑡 − 𝐾𝐴1 𝑟1𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓 − 𝐾𝐴2 𝑟1𝑡 − 𝑟2𝑡 
= 0 … 3.20 
𝑅𝐸𝑆2𝑡 − 𝑋  
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
 + 𝐼𝑀  
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
,𝑌1𝑡 + 𝐾𝐴2 𝑟1𝑡 − 𝑟2𝑡 = 0 … 3.21 
𝑊1𝑡 = 𝑌1𝑁1𝑡 .
𝑃1𝑡
𝑃1𝑒𝑡
…3.28 
𝑊2𝑡 = 𝑌2𝑁2𝑡𝑃2𝑡 … 3.29 
𝑁1𝑡 =  𝑒
𝜙𝑝𝑔 1𝑡𝑁1  
𝑊1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
−
𝑊2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
 … 3.30 
𝑁2𝑡 = 𝑒
𝜙𝑝𝑔 2𝑡𝑁2  
𝑊1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
−
𝑊2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
 … 3.31 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜏0 + 𝑟
∗ + 𝜏𝑝 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1  + 𝜏𝑦𝑌𝑡 … 3.32 
𝑃𝑡 = 𝜙𝑝𝑃1𝑡 +  1 − 𝜙𝑝 𝑃2𝑡 … 3.33 
𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌1𝑡 + 𝑌2𝑡 …3.34 
𝑟1𝑡 = 𝜙10 + 𝜙𝑟1𝑟𝑡 + 𝑟𝑓 − 𝑒𝑥𝑡 … 3.35 
𝑟2𝑡 = 𝜙20 + 𝜙𝑟2𝑟𝑡 + 𝜙𝑟21𝑟1𝑡 … 3.36 
which is a set of fifteen equations in fifteen unknowns: 
𝑌1𝑡 ,𝑀1𝑡 , 𝑟1𝑡 ,𝑁1𝑡 ,𝑊1𝑡 ,𝑃1𝑡 ,𝑌2𝑡 ,𝑀2𝑡 , 𝑟2𝑡 ,𝑁2𝑡 ,𝑊2𝑡 ,𝑃2𝑡 , 𝑟𝑡 ,𝑃𝑡 ,𝑌𝑡  
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3.3 STATEMENT OF THE THEORETICAL PROPOSITIONS 
The system of equations above provide a guide to the analysis of the regional macroeconomic 
impacts of fiscal policies, reflected in an increase in government spending, and the national 
monetary policy reflected in changes in the policy instrument – the monetary policy rate, fixed 
by a variant of the Taylor (1993) rule.  
With respect to the regions 1 and 2, the impact of government spending in both the regions and 
the national monetary policy are revealed in the following propositions based on the solution to 
the system of equations presented above: 
i. Region 1’s fiscal expansion in the government spending could have an expansionary and 
contractionary growth impact if the respective conditions: 1 − 𝐶1𝑦1 1 − 𝑇1𝑦1 − 𝐼1𝑦1 −
𝐿1𝑦1 𝐶1𝑚 + 𝐼1𝑚  + 2𝐼𝑀1𝑦1 ≶ 0 and 1 − 𝐶1𝑦1 1 − 𝑇1𝑦1 − 𝐼1𝑦1 − 𝐿1𝑦1 𝐶1𝑚 + 𝐼1𝑚  +
2𝐼𝑀1𝑦1 ≷ 0 so strongly as to ensure that  𝐴 1 < 0.Region 2’s fiscal expansion in 
government spending has an inter-regional effect on region 1’s growth that is complexly 
dependent on the sizes of its marginal propensities to consume and invest out of income 
and money supply on the one hand and the size of the response of region 1’s exports to 
international and inter-regional terms of trade. Hence if:1 − 𝐶1𝑦1 1 − 𝑇1𝑦1 − 𝐼1𝑦1 −
𝐿1𝑦1 𝐶1𝑚 + 𝐼1𝑚  + 2𝐼𝑀1𝑦1 ≶ 0; 
1 − 𝐶2𝑦2 1 − 𝑇2𝑦2 − 𝐼2𝑦2 ≶ 0and𝑋1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
𝑃𝑓 + 𝑋1𝑝2
𝑝1
𝑃2𝑡 ≶ 𝑃1𝑡
3 + 𝐼𝑀
1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
 then region 1 is 
expected to record output growth and retardation if otherwise. On the contrary the 
expansion in the region 2’s output due to an expansion in government expenditure is 
contingent on the violation of the condition 1 − 𝐶2𝑦2 1 − 𝑇2𝑦2 − 𝐼2𝑦2 > 0 and hence it 
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is seen that the benefit to the regions from the government expenditure operations of the 
region 2 is mutually exclusive. However the region 2 is better off if region 1 expands its 
government expenditure given the conditions 1 − 𝐶1𝑦1 1 − 𝑇1𝑦1 − 𝐼1𝑦1 − 𝐿1𝑦1 𝐶1𝑚 +
𝐼1𝑚  + 2𝐼𝑀1𝑦1 ≶ 0; 1 − 𝐶2𝑦2 1 − 𝑇2𝑦2 − 𝐼2𝑦2 ≶ 0 and hence the region 2 benefits from 
the positive external effects of the expansion in government spending in the region 1.. 
 
The positive impact of government spending on output growth is contingent on how large the 
marginal propensity to import 𝐼𝑀1𝑦1  for the region 1 relative to the sizes of the marginal 
propensities of consumption and investment given the tax rate. The violation of this condition, 
albeit strongly, will result in a contraction in the national output. 
Inter-regional positive growth spillovers are the result if the affected region in question has a net 
export component that is quite large enough in relation to the total final expenditure components 
and hence in a national economic configuration made up of regional economies with inherent 
imbalances in the magnitudes of growth it is expected that regions will seek to expand its net 
export operations to regions with comparatively high demand for its exports and this would 
ensure that fiscal expansion in the export demanding region would accelerate growth in the 
exporting region and this is in addition to the growth prospects from exports to other countries of 
the world of goods and services where comparative advantages exist. 
ii. Fiscal expansion in the region 1 is expected to expand money supply in the same 
region provided 1 − 𝐶1𝑦1 1 − 𝑇1𝑦1 − 𝐼1𝑦1 − 𝐿1𝑦1 𝐶1𝑚 + 𝐼1𝑚  + 2𝐼𝑀1𝑦1 > 0 holds 
otherwise money supply contracts. However fiscal expansion in the region 2 given the 
conditions: 𝐶1𝑚𝐿1𝑦1 + 𝐼1𝑚𝐿1𝑦1 + 𝐶1𝑦1 1 − 𝑇1𝑦1 + 𝐼1𝑦1 ≶ 1 and 1 − 𝐶2𝑦2 1 −
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𝑇2𝑦2 − 𝐼2𝑦2 ≶  0 would also trigger an expansion in the money supply of the region 1 
but the violation of either of these conditions would result in a contraction of money 
supply in the event of an expansion in extra-regional government spending. Region 
2’s fiscal expansion by way of an expansion in government expenditure has the effect 
of increasing money supply if 
𝑀2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
𝐼𝑀2𝑦2 + 𝐿2𝑦2  𝑋2𝑝2
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀2𝑝2
𝑝1
 ≶ 0 and 1 −
𝐶2𝑦2 1 − 𝑇2𝑦2 − 𝐼2𝑦2 ≶  0 else government expenditure expansion may result in 
monetary contraction. However given the violation of the later condition 
𝑀2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
𝐼𝑀2𝑦2 +
𝐿2𝑦2  𝑋2𝑝2
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀2𝑝2
𝑝1
 > 0 it is expected that the expansion in the government 
spending of the region 1 is expected to have positive monetary expansionary effects 
on the region 2. Thus if 1 − 𝐶2𝑦2 1 − 𝑇2𝑦2 − 𝐼2𝑦2 >  0 then the region 2 could 
record monetary expansion resulting from own government spending and extra-
regional government spending. 
Government expenditure is compatible with increasing quantum of money if the ratio of the 
marginal propensity to import to the demand for money sensitivity to income exceeds the 
combined marginal propensities to consume and import out of real money balances. The 
violation of this condition results in a contraction of money supply. The attainment of the two 
conditions for the expansionary monetary effect of an increase in extra-regional government 
expenditure is unlikely as the fact that the derivatives all lie between zero and unity renders it 
possible that the attainment of one of the conditions could imply the invalidation of the other 
condition and hence extra-regional government expenditure could stem the growth of money 
supply in a given region. There are conditions under which regional governments can have 
monetary expansion owing to own government spending as well as regional government 
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spending and this is expected to call for a more discriminatory monetary policy formulation to 
stem the likely inflationary effects from government spending on the aggregate. 
iii. Fiscal expenditure growth is expected to be inflationary in the region 1 given the 
condition: 1 − 𝐶1𝑦1 1 − 𝑇1𝑦1 − 𝐼1𝑦1 − 𝐿1𝑦1 𝐶1𝑚 + 𝐼1𝑚  + 2𝐼𝑀1𝑦1 > 0 and the 
given that same condition if 1 − 𝐶2𝑦2 1 − 𝑇2𝑦2 − 𝐼2𝑦2 > 0 then it is expected that 
region 2 growth in government expenditure would result in a deflationary trend in the 
region 1. The attainment of the condition 1 − 𝐶2𝑦2 1 − 𝑇2𝑦2 − 𝐼2𝑦2 > 0 which is in 
conjunction with the former condition is expected to engender a deflationary trend in 
the region 1, will result in an inflationary trend in the region 2 and this is in 
consonance with the effect of region2’s government spending on monetary expansion. 
In addition to the later condition, if 1 − 𝐶1𝑦1 1 − 𝑇1𝑦1 − 𝐼1𝑦1 − 𝐿1𝑦1 𝐶1𝑚 + 𝐼1𝑚  +
2𝐼𝑀1𝑦1 > 0 then it is expected that region 1 government spending could engender an 
inflationary trend in the region 2. 
While government expenditure expansion may be inflationary in the region where fiscal 
expansion is recorded, dependent on the relative size of propensity to consume and invest out of 
income to those of real money balances, extra regional fiscal expansion reflected in government 
expenditure expansion has the effect of engendering a deflationary trend. However if the size of 
the propensity to consume and invest out of real money balances exceeds that of the propensities 
to consume out of income then it is expected that extra-regional expenditure could also be 
inflationary. 
iv. Interest rate changes in both the regions 1 and 2 are expected to contain extra-
regional effects since the policy rate does not respond in a discriminating manner but 
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rather avails the aggregate price and output information towards the formulation of 
the policy rate which impinges on the domestic interest rate. 
Monetary policy in the economy is based on aggregate targets and a policy instrument is availed 
for the two regions and determines the interest rates in the both regions. Hence expansions or 
contractions in the output and price, irrespective of the regions responsible for the output and 
price changes, will induce policy rate changes that would impact on regional interest rates. 
4. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
The reality of regional fiscal policy is the possibility that it could either be beneficial or adverse 
for the implementing region and there is the possibility of also beneficial and adverse spillover 
effects of extra-regional fiscal policies. In addition, in a country where monetary policy is based 
on information on aggregates and not tailored to suit the peculiarities of the regions, it is 
expected that monetary policy could produce impacts in a region where its macroeconomic 
variables have remained relatively stable – as a result of its inter-connection with regions where 
macroeconomic dynamics are heavily represented in the aggregate quantities upon which 
monetary policy is framed. 
It is thus pertinent that the analytical framework advanced in this study be examined empirically 
to quantify the magnitude of these spillover and regional effects of regional policies and 
highlight ways in which relatively less developed regions can get up to speed in its course of 
development and trigger a convergence path for the entire regions in the national economy. 
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Appendix: 
Analytical Framework 
On considering the real, money and external sectors of the region 1, the following subsystem of 
equations are differentiated totally and arranged below: 
 1 − 𝐶1𝑦1 1 − 𝑇1𝑦1 − 𝐼1𝑦1 + 𝐼𝑀1𝑦1 𝑑𝑌1𝑡 −
𝐶1𝑚 + 𝐼1𝑚
𝑃1𝑡
𝑑𝑀1𝑡
+   𝐶1𝑚 + 𝐼1𝑚  
𝑀1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
2 +  𝑋1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀
1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
 
𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
2 + 𝑋1𝑝2
𝑝1
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
2  𝑑𝑃1𝑡
= 𝑑𝐺 1 +  𝑋1𝑒𝑥 − 𝐼𝑀1𝑒𝑥  𝑑𝑒𝑥 +  𝑋1𝑝2
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀
1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
 
𝑑𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
+  𝐶1𝑟1 + 𝐼1𝑟1  𝑑𝜙10 + 𝜙𝑟1𝑑𝑟𝑡 + 𝑑𝑟𝑓 − 𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 … 1 
𝐿1𝑦1𝑑𝑌1𝑡 −
𝑑𝑀1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
+
𝑀1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
2 𝑑𝑃1𝑡 = −𝐿1𝑟1 𝑑𝜙10 + 𝜙𝑟1𝑑𝑟𝑡 + 𝑑𝑟𝑓 − 𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 …2 
𝐼𝑀1𝑦1𝑑𝑌1𝑡 −  𝑋1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀
1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
 
𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
2 𝑑𝑃1𝑡
=  𝐾𝐴1𝑟1 + 𝐾𝐴2𝑟1  𝑑𝜙10 + 𝜙𝑟1𝑑𝑟𝑡 + 𝑑𝑟𝑓 − 𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 +  𝑋1𝑒𝑥 − 𝐼𝑀1𝑒𝑥  𝑑𝑒𝑥
+  𝑋1𝑝2
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀
1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
 
𝑑𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
−𝐾𝐴1𝑟𝑓𝑑𝑟𝑓 −𝐾𝐴2𝑟2𝑑𝑟2𝑡 − 𝑑𝑅𝐸𝑆1𝑡  … 3 
𝑑𝑟1𝑡 = 𝑑𝜙10 + 𝜙𝑟1𝑑𝑟𝑡 + 𝑑𝑟𝑓 − 𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 … 4 
𝑑𝑟2𝑡 = 𝑑𝜙20 + 𝜙𝑟2𝑑𝑟𝑡 + 𝜙𝑟21𝑑𝑟1𝑡 … 5 
and on solving the sub-system for the derivatives and obtaining the partial derivatives of the 
endogenous variables with respect to prices 𝑃1𝑡 ,𝑃2𝑡  and government expenditure 𝐺1𝑡 :  
𝛿𝑌1𝑡
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
=  𝑋1𝑝2
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀
1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
  
𝐴1𝑚 .𝐴2𝑝 − 𝐴2𝑚𝐴1𝑝
𝑃1𝑡 .  𝐴 1
+
𝐴2𝑚𝐴3𝑝
𝑃1𝑡 .  𝐴 1
 … 6 
𝛿𝑌1𝑡
𝛿𝐺 1
=
𝐴3𝑝𝐴2𝑚
 𝐴 1
… 7 
𝛿𝑀1𝑡
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
=  𝑋1𝑝2
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀
1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
  
𝐴1𝑝𝐴2𝑦
𝑃1𝑡  𝐴 1
+
 𝐴2𝑝𝐴3𝑦 − 𝐴3𝑝𝐴2𝑦 
𝑃1𝑡  𝐴 1
−
𝐴1𝑦𝐴2𝑝
𝑃1𝑡  𝐴 1
 … 8 
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𝛿𝑀1𝑡
𝛿𝐺 1
=
𝐴2𝑝𝐴3𝑦 − 𝐴3𝑝𝐴2𝑦
 𝐴 1
… 9 
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
=  𝑋1𝑝2
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀
1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
  
 𝐴1𝑦𝐴2𝑚 − 𝐴2𝑦𝐴1𝑚  
𝑃1𝑡  𝐴 1
−
𝐴3𝑦𝐴2𝑚
𝑃1𝑡  𝐴 1
 … 10 
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
𝛿𝐺 1
= −
𝐴3𝑦𝐴2𝑚
 𝐴 1
… 11 
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
𝛿𝐺 2
=
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
.
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
𝛿𝐺 2
… 12 
𝛿𝑌1𝑡
𝛿𝐺 2
=
𝛿𝑌1𝑡
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
𝛿𝐺 2
= − 
𝐴6𝑦𝐴5𝑚
 𝐴 2
  𝑋1𝑝2
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀
1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
  
𝐴1𝑚 .𝐴2𝑝 − 𝐴2𝑚𝐴1𝑝
𝑃1𝑡 .  𝐴 1
+
𝐴2𝑚𝐴3𝑝
𝑃1𝑡 .  𝐴 1
 …13 
𝛿𝑟1𝑡
𝛿𝐺𝑖𝑡
= 𝜏𝑝𝜙𝑟1𝜙𝑝
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
𝛿𝐺𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜏𝑝𝜙𝑟1 1 − 𝜙𝑝 
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
𝛿𝐺𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜙𝑟1𝜏𝑦
𝛿𝑌1𝑡
𝛿𝐺𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜙𝑟1𝜏𝑦
𝛿𝑌2𝑡
𝛿𝐺𝑖𝑡
 ∀ 𝑖 = {1,2} 
where 
𝐴1𝑦 =  1 − 𝐶1𝑦1 1 − 𝑇1𝑦1 − 𝐼1𝑦1 + 𝐼𝑀1𝑦1 > 0;𝐴1𝑚 = −
𝐶1𝑚 + 𝐼1𝑚
𝑃1𝑡
< 0;𝐴1𝑝
=   𝐶1𝑚 + 𝐼1𝑚  
𝑀1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
2 +  𝑋1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀
1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
 
𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
2 + 𝑋1𝑝2
𝑝1
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
2  > 0;𝑑𝐵1
=  𝑋1𝑒𝑥 − 𝐼𝑀1𝑒𝑥  𝑑𝑒𝑥 +  𝐶1𝑟1 + 𝐼1𝑟1  𝑑𝜙10 + 𝜙𝑟1𝑑𝑟𝑡 + 𝑑𝑟𝑓 − 𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 ≷ 0 
𝐴2𝑦 = 𝐿1𝑦1 > 0;𝐴2𝑚 = −
1
𝑃1𝑡
< 0;𝐴2𝑝 =
𝑀1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
2 > 0 
𝐴3𝑦 = 𝐼𝑀1𝑦1 > 0;𝐴3𝑝 = − 𝑋1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀
1
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
 
𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
2 < 0; 
𝑑𝐵3 =  𝐾𝐴1𝑟1 + 𝐾𝐴2𝑟1 − 𝐾𝐴2𝑟2𝜙𝑟21 𝑑𝜙10 −𝐾𝐴2𝑟2𝑑𝜙20
+  𝐾𝐴1𝑟1𝜙𝑟1 + 𝐾𝐴2𝑟1𝜙𝑟1 −𝐾𝐴2𝑟2𝜙𝑟2 −𝐾𝐴2𝑟2𝜙𝑟21𝜙𝑟1 𝑑𝑟𝑡
+  𝐾𝐴1𝑟1 + 𝐾𝐴2𝑟1 − 𝐾𝐴1𝑟𝑓 −𝐾𝐴2𝑟2𝜙𝑟21 𝑑𝑟𝑓
+  𝑋1𝑒𝑥 − 𝐼𝑀1𝑒𝑥 −𝐾𝐴1𝑟1 − 𝐾𝐴2𝑟1 + 𝐾𝐴2𝑟2𝜙𝑟21 𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝑑𝑅𝐸𝑆1𝑡 ≷ 0 
𝑑𝐵2 = −𝐿1𝑟1 𝑑𝜙10 + 𝜙𝑟1𝑑𝑟𝑡 + 𝑑𝑟𝑓 − 𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 ≷ 0 
 𝐴 1 = 𝐴3𝑦𝐴1𝑚𝐴2𝑝 + 𝐴3𝑝𝐴1𝑦𝐴2𝑚 − 𝐴3𝑦𝐴2𝑚𝐴1𝑝 − 𝐴3𝑝𝐴2𝑦𝐴1𝑚  
24 | P a g e  
 
On turning to the subsystem of equations dealing with the real, money and external sectors of the 
region 2 
 1 − 𝐶2𝑦2 1 − 𝑇2𝑦2 − 𝐼2𝑦2 + 𝐼𝑀2𝑦2 𝑑𝑌2𝑡 +  𝑋2𝑝2
𝑝1
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
2 − 𝐼𝑀2
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
2  𝑑𝑃1𝑡
= 𝑑𝐺 2 + 𝐼2𝑟2 𝑑𝜙20 + 𝜙𝑟2𝑑𝑟𝑡 + 𝜙𝑟21𝑑𝑟1𝑡 +  𝑋2𝑝2
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀2𝑝2
𝑝1
 
𝑑𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
… 13 
𝐿2𝑦2𝑑𝑌2𝑡 −
𝑑𝑀2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
+
𝑀2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
2 𝑑𝑃2𝑡 = −𝐿2𝑟2 𝑑𝜙20 + 𝜙𝑟2𝑑𝑟𝑡 + 𝜙𝑟21𝑑𝑟1𝑡 … 14 
𝐼𝑀2𝑦2𝑑𝑌2𝑡 −  𝑋2𝑝2
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀2𝑝2
𝑝1
 
𝑑𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
= 𝐾𝐴2𝑟2 𝑑𝜙20 + 𝜙𝑟2𝑑𝑟𝑡 + 𝜙𝑟21𝑑𝑟1𝑡 +  𝑋2
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀2𝑝2
𝑝1
 
𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
2 𝑑𝑃1𝑡 −𝐾𝐴2𝑟1𝑑𝑟1𝑡
− 𝑑𝑅𝐸𝑆2𝑡  … 15 
𝑑𝑟1𝑡 = 𝑑𝜙10 + 𝜙𝑟1𝑑𝑟𝑡 + 𝑑𝑟𝑓 − 𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 … 4 
𝑑𝑟2𝑡 = 𝑑𝜙20 + 𝜙𝑟2𝑑𝑟𝑡 + 𝜙𝑟21𝑑𝑟1𝑡 … 5 
On solving for the endogenous derivatives in the sub-system of equations corresponding to the 
region 2 and obtaining the partial derivatives with respect to prices 𝑃1𝑡 ,𝑃2𝑡  and government 
expenditure 𝐺2𝑡  the following results: 
𝛿𝑌2𝑡
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
=  𝑋2𝑝2
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀
2
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
  
𝐴5𝑚𝐴6𝑝𝑃2𝑡
 𝐴 2𝑃1𝑡
2 +
𝐴4𝑝𝐴5𝑚𝑃𝑓
 𝐴 2𝑃1𝑡
2   
𝛿𝑌2𝑡
𝛿𝐺 1
=
𝐴5𝑚𝐴6𝑝
 𝐴 2
 
𝛿𝑀2𝑡
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
=  𝑋
2
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀
2
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
  
 𝐴4𝑝𝐴5𝑦 − 𝐴4𝑦𝐴5𝑝 𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
2  𝐴 2
+
 𝐴5𝑦𝐴6𝑝 − 𝐴5𝑝𝐴6𝑦 𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
2  𝐴 2
  
𝛿𝑀2𝑡
𝛿𝐺 2
=
 𝐴5𝑝𝐴6𝑦 − 𝐴5𝑦𝐴6𝑝 
 𝐴 2
 
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
=  
𝐴4𝑦𝐴5𝑚𝑃𝑓
𝑃1𝑡
2  𝐴 2
+
𝐴6𝑦𝐴5𝑚𝑃2𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
2  𝐴 2
  𝑋
2
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀
2
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
  
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
𝛿𝐺 2
= −
𝐴6𝑦𝐴5𝑚
 𝐴 2
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𝛿𝑟2𝑡
𝛿𝐺𝑖𝑡
= 𝜏𝑝𝜙𝑟2𝜙𝑝
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
𝛿𝐺𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜏𝑝𝜙𝑟2 1 − 𝜙𝑝 
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
𝛿𝐺𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜙𝑟2𝜏𝑦
𝛿𝑌1𝑡
𝛿𝐺𝑖𝑡
+ 𝜙𝑟2𝜏𝑦
𝛿𝑌2𝑡
𝛿𝐺𝑖𝑡
 ∀ 𝑖 = {1,2} 
where: 
𝐴4𝑦 =  1 − 𝐶2𝑦2 1 − 𝑇2𝑦2 − 𝐼2𝑦2 + 𝐼𝑀2𝑦2 > 0;𝐴4𝑝 = − 𝑋2𝑝2
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀
2
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
 
1
𝑃1𝑡
< 0;𝑑𝐵4
= 𝐼2𝑟2𝑑𝜙20 + 𝐼2𝑟2𝜙𝑟21𝑑𝜙10 + 𝐼2𝑟2 𝜙𝑟2 + 𝜙𝑟21𝜙𝑟1 𝑑𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼2𝑟2𝜙𝑟21𝑑𝑟𝑓
− 𝐼2𝑟2𝜙𝑟21𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 ≷ 0 
𝐴5𝑦 = 𝐿2𝑦2 > 0;𝐴5𝑚 = −
1
𝑃2𝑡
< 0;𝐴5𝑝 =
𝑀2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
2 > 0;𝑑𝐵5
= −𝐿2𝑟2 𝑑𝜙20 + 𝜙𝑟21𝑑𝜙10 +  𝜙𝑟2 + 𝜙𝑟21𝜙𝑟1 𝑑𝑟𝑡 + 𝜙𝑟21𝑑𝑟𝑓 − 𝜙𝑟21𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 ≷ 0 
𝐴6𝑦 = 𝐼𝑀2𝑦2 > 0;𝑑𝐵6
= 𝐾𝐴2𝑟2𝑑𝜙20 + 𝐾𝐴2𝑟2𝜙𝑟21𝑑𝜙10 + 𝐾𝐴2𝑟2 𝜙𝑟2 + 𝜙𝑟21𝜙𝑟1 𝑑𝑟𝑡 + 𝐾𝐴2𝑟2𝜙𝑟21𝑑𝑟𝑓
−𝐾𝐴2𝑟2𝜙𝑟21𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡 −𝐾𝐴2𝑟1𝑑𝜙10 −𝐾𝐴2𝑟1𝜙𝑟1𝑑𝑟𝑡 − 𝐾𝐴2𝑟1𝑑𝑟𝑓 + 𝐾𝐴2𝑟1𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑡
− 𝑑𝑅𝐸𝑆2𝑡 ≷ 0 
𝐴6𝑝 = − 𝑋2𝑝2
𝑝1
− 𝐼𝑀
2
𝑝𝑓
𝑝1
 
1
𝑃1𝑡
> 0;  𝐴 2 = 𝐴4𝑦𝐴5𝑚𝐴6𝑝 − 𝐴4𝑝𝐴5𝑚𝐴6𝑦  
On turning to the productivity and employment sectors of the region 1 and region 2, the total 
derivatives are: 
𝑑𝑊1𝑡 = 𝑌1𝑁1𝑁1𝑑𝑁1𝑡 +
𝑑𝑃1𝑡
𝑃1𝑒𝑡
−
𝑃1𝑡
𝑃1𝑒𝑡
2 𝑑𝑃1𝑒𝑡 … 16 
𝑑𝑊2𝑡 = 𝑌2𝑁2𝑁2𝑑𝑁2𝑡 + 𝑑𝑃2𝑡 … 17 
𝑑𝑁1𝑡 =  𝜙𝑝𝑔1𝑁1𝑡 + 𝑁1𝑤1
𝑝1
.
𝑑𝑊1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
−𝑁1𝑤1
𝑝1
.
𝑊1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
2 . 𝑑𝑃1𝑡 + 𝑁1𝑤2
𝑝2
.
𝑑𝑊2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
−𝑁1𝑤2
𝑝2
.
𝑊2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
2 . 𝑑𝑃2𝑡 … 18 
𝑑𝑁2𝑡 =  𝜙𝑝𝑔2𝑁2𝑡 + 𝑁2𝑤1
𝑝1
.
𝑑𝑊1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
− 𝑁2𝑤1
𝑝1
.
𝑊1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
2 .𝑑𝑃1𝑡 + 𝑁2𝑤2
𝑝2
.
𝑑𝑊2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
−𝑁2𝑤2
𝑝2
.
𝑊2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
2 . 𝑑𝑃2𝑡 … 19 
On solving the system of equations and obtaining the partial derivatives with respect to prices 
𝑃1𝑡 ,𝑃2𝑡  the following results: 
𝛿𝑁2𝑡
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
=   
𝐸1𝑁1𝑡
𝐸1𝑁1𝑡𝐸2𝑁2𝑡 − 𝐸2𝑁1𝑡𝐸1𝑁2𝑡
 
𝑁1𝑡
𝑁1
𝑁1𝑤1
𝑝1
−  
𝐸2𝑁1𝑡
𝐸1𝑁1𝑡𝐸2𝑁2𝑡 − 𝐸2𝑁1𝑡𝐸1𝑁2𝑡
 
𝑁2𝑡
𝑁2
𝑁2𝑤1
𝑝1
  
1
𝑃1𝑡𝑃1𝑒𝑡
−
𝑊1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
2   
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𝛿𝑁2𝑡
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
=   
𝐸1𝑁1𝑡
𝐸1𝑁1𝑡𝐸2𝑁2𝑡 − 𝐸2𝑁1𝑡𝐸1𝑁2𝑡
 
𝑁2𝑡
𝑁2
𝑁2𝑤2
𝑝2
−  
𝐸2𝑁1𝑡
𝐸1𝑁1𝑡𝐸2𝑁2𝑡 − 𝐸2𝑁1𝑡𝐸1𝑁2𝑡
 
𝑁1𝑡
𝑁1
𝑁1𝑤2
𝑝2
  
1
𝑃2𝑡
−
𝑊2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
2   
𝛿𝑁1𝑡
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
=   
𝐸2𝑁2𝑡
𝐸1𝑁1𝑡𝐸2𝑁2𝑡 − 𝐸2𝑁1𝑡𝐸1𝑁2𝑡
 
𝑁1𝑡
𝑁1
𝑁1𝑤1
𝑝1
−  
𝐸1𝑁2𝑡
𝐸1𝑁1𝑡𝐸2𝑁2𝑡 − 𝐸2𝑁1𝑡𝐸1𝑁2𝑡
 
𝑁2𝑡
𝑁2
𝑁2𝑤1
𝑝1
  
1
𝑃1𝑡𝑃1𝑒𝑡
−
𝑊1𝑡
𝑃1𝑡
2   
𝛿𝑁1𝑡
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
=   
𝐸2𝑁2𝑡
𝐸1𝑁1𝑡𝐸2𝑁2𝑡 − 𝐸2𝑁1𝑡𝐸1𝑁2𝑡
 
𝑁1𝑡
𝑁1
𝑁1𝑤2
𝑝2
−  
𝐸1𝑁2𝑡
𝐸1𝑁1𝑡𝐸2𝑁2𝑡 − 𝐸2𝑁1𝑡𝐸1𝑁2𝑡
 
𝑁2𝑡
𝑁2
𝑁2𝑤2
𝑝2
  
1
𝑃2𝑡
−
𝑊2𝑡
𝑃2𝑡
2   
Where 
𝐸1𝑁1𝑡 = 1 − 𝑁1𝑤1
𝑝1
.
𝑌1𝑁1𝑁1
𝑃1𝑡
> 0;𝐸1𝑁2𝑡 = −𝑁1𝑤2
𝑝2
.
𝑌2𝑁2𝑁2
𝑃2𝑡
< 0; 
𝐸2𝑁1𝑡 = −𝑁2𝑤1
𝑝1
.
𝑌1𝑁1𝑁1
𝑃1𝑡
< 0;𝐸2𝑁2𝑡 = 1 −𝑁2𝑤2
𝑝2
.
𝑌2𝑁2𝑁2
𝑃2𝑡
> 0; 
and hence in the case of the respective wages of the regions 1 and 2 the following are expected: 
𝛿𝑊1𝑡
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
= 𝑌1𝑁1𝑁1
𝛿𝑁1𝑡
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
+
1
𝑃1𝑒𝑡
 
𝛿𝑊1𝑡
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
= 𝑌1𝑁1𝑁1
𝛿𝑁1𝑡
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
 
and 
𝛿𝑊2𝑡
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
= 𝑌2𝑁2𝑁2
𝛿𝑁2𝑡
𝛿𝑃1𝑡
 
𝛿𝑊2𝑡
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
= 𝑌2𝑁2𝑁2
𝛿𝑁2𝑡
𝛿𝑃2𝑡
+ 1 
On substituting the aggregate price level equation and the aggregate output equation into the 
monetary policy rule, the total derivative is given as: 
𝑑𝑟𝑡 = 𝑑𝜏0 + 𝑑𝑟
∗ + 𝜏𝑝 𝜙𝑝𝑑𝑃1𝑡 +  1 −𝜙𝑝 𝑑𝑃2𝑡 + 𝜏𝑝 𝜙𝑝𝑑𝑃1𝑡−1 +  1 − 𝜙𝑝 𝑑𝑃2𝑡−1 + 𝜏𝑦𝑑𝑌1𝑡
+ 𝜏𝑦𝑑𝑌2𝑡 … 20 
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On the basis of the monetary rule the following ensues: 
𝛿𝑟𝑡
𝛿𝑃𝑖𝑡
=
𝜙𝑝
∗𝜏𝑝
𝑃𝑖𝑡
 ∀ 𝑖 =  1,2 ;  𝜙𝑝
∗ =  𝜙𝑝 , 1 − 𝜙𝑝  
𝛿𝑟𝑡
𝛿𝑌𝑖𝑡
= 𝜏𝑦  ∀ 𝑖 =  1,2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
